'Hong Kong Nationalism': why 'national identification' cannot be directly equated with independence
The article is part of the 'Hong Kong Anti-extradition Demonstrations: One Year Ago Today' initiative which aims to raise awareness for the movement and also to debunk some myths regarding the movement’s origins and core elements.
Due to the article's original length, we have had to split its content over three separate pieces. For a more complete understanding of the discourse surrounding 'Hong Kong Nationalism,' please refer to the links below.
'Hong Kong Nationalism' and 'Hong Kong Independence': why 'national identification' cannot be directly equated with 'independence'
There is no obvious answer to this discourse and it would be impossible to generalise and claim that my piece speaks for all the voices in Hong Kong. However, on a backdrop of over twelve months of socio-political unrest and the intrusive threat that is the recently-passed National Security Law, public attitudes have significantly shifted since the beginning of the anti-extradition demonstrations. One of the most visible changes is that in the protestor’s slogans.
From previous calls for ‘5 Demands, Not One Less’ used during the Anti-extradition Demonstrations to demand the withdrawal of the Extradition Bill, to the recent surfacing of ‘沒有自治,唯有獨立’ (‘No Autonomy, Only Independence’) and ‘民族自強,香港獨立’ (‘One Nation, One Hong Kong’) greater calls for people to ‘stand together’ and ‘fight for freedom’ can be heard amidst the multitudes that belong to the Hong Kong community.
A reading of yesterday’s article, ‘Hong Kong’s National Security Law: Autonomy at its End’ help explicate that the law’s main aims are to ‘combat radical violence, foreign interference and pre-independent forces in the region.’ Whilst it has been repeatedly clarified by the Foreign Ministry that only a small number of people will be impacted by the Bill and that for the most, it serves as greater protection of Hong Kong’s national security and safeguards its long-term prosperity and stability, its application to ‘pro-independent forces’ necessarily spans an array of rhetorics; some of which, quite literally, ‘don’t fit the bill’.
Referring to forces that incite social tearing and political chaos, the classification ‘ pro-Hong Kong Independence’ (港獨) conveniently ignores distinctions between calls for ‘independence’ versus those supporting ‘Hong Kong nationalism.’ It not only equates political motivations with discourses around socio-cultural identification, it conveniently collectivises separatism, localism, nationalism, demands for self-autonomous rule and democracy under the same motivations of ‘Hong Kong independence.’ The nature of the National Security Bill is intrusive due to its encroachment of people’s freedom of choice in social identification as the people of Hong Kong.
Modern ‘localism’ and ‘Hong Kong nationalism’: why 'national identification' cannot be directly equated with 'independence'
Modern ‘localism’ and ‘Hong Kong nationalism’ are necessarily two sides of the same coin. However, in order to truly understand the two terms, one must decouple the term’s association to ‘Hong Kong’.
‘Nationalism’ in its simplest terms refers to an ‘ideology based on the premise that the individual’s loyalty and devotion to the nation-state surpass other individual or group interests.’ Premised on the theory of ‘nation-state’ and that each nationality should form a state, the state should in return encompass everyone within the nationality. Whilst it can be further divided into the common groupings of ‘civic nationalism’ and ‘ethnic nationalism,’ it’s arguably the case that there exists no official ‘nationality’ amongst the people of Hong Kong; its organic proliferation under the city’s socio-economic climate reveals it to be a socially constructed identity defined within a political remit.
‘Ethnic nationalism’ and ‘civic nationalism’ differ in terms of their relatives for ‘national ’identification. Whilst the former focuses on commonalities in blood relations (kinship), ethnicity, ancestry, language and culture, the latter emphasizes more on the ‘core values’ held by the members of the same community. Whilst, civic nationalism rests on the theory of the ‘nation-state,’ in an age of globalisation, place of birth is no longer the sole determinant of your ‘nationality.’ Instead, ‘nationality’ is more often associated with your citizenship. When you acquire a new citizenship, whilst your place of birth does not change, your nationality can and does.
When applied to Hong Kong, classification into either subgroup becomes difficult as not only is Hong Kong home to 600,000 ethnic minorities in its various immigrant and expatriate communities, it’s status as an international hub has proven unconstructive in its ‘national identification.’ Whilst China does not allow for dual nationality, Hong Kong does. However, the complication arises when it’s considered that Hong Kong does not have its own citizenship system. Passports are for travel purposes whilst identification cards are for ‘national identification.’ However, in a city that does not refer to its indigenous population as ‘citizens’ but rather, ‘permanent residents’, it has made it impossible for anyone living in the city to lay claims of being a ‘Hong Kong citizen’. Under official terms, ‘Hong Kong citizens’ are ‘Chinese citizens’ and all possess a Chinese nationality. However, ‘Chinese nationalism’ does not ring true with the people of Hong Kong due to distinctions in culture, language and ultimately, core values.
Hong Kong’s national identification does not fit well with traditional conceptions of nationalism. Benedict Anderson’s theory of Imagined Communities proffers a widened remit for the discussion of ‘Hong Kong nationalism.’ According to Anderson, ‘nationalism has to be understood by aligning it not with self-consciously held political ideologies, but with large cultural systems that preceded it.’ To claim that ‘Hong Kong nationalism’ is without political rhetorics would be inaccurate but the discourse is distorted when terms such as ‘secessionist’ and ‘separatist’ continue to be coupled with ‘Hong Kong nationalism.’
‘Hong Kong nationalism’ differs greatly from what was once known as ‘localism.’ However, this does not mean to say that the nature of ‘Hong Kong nationalism’ has changed. The current socio-political climate has simply disallowed for importance to be shed on ‘culture.’ It is an inarguable truth that Hong Kong’s rich culture and heritage has suffered neglect during the social unrest and political chaos. Whilst it is yet to be homogenised under sentiments of ‘official nationalism’ in China, its only real display during this period is in protest slogans; using Hong Kong’s indigenous culture to call upon the hearts of its community.
Displays of modern ‘localism’ are evident in the various features of the anti-extradition demonstrations. From protest art to anthems and slogans, the Cantonese language and culture remain fundamental to Hong Kong’s social identification; more importantly, for its ‘national identification.’ Whilst both employ basic Cantonese slang and phrases, comparison of the slogans used during the anti-extradition demonstrations and the ones currently in use proffer a measure of the extent of change in public attitudes.
Protest slogans are important as they necessarily combine people’s thought, speech and action into a singular phrase. They not only help motivate the movement’s supporters but further represent the movement as a whole. When a new slogan is formed, it is symbolic of the conception of a new thought, a new phrase of speech and dictates for a new set of behaviours and actions to be taken. Furthermore, it offers a new sense of direction for its supporters and transformations in protest slogans are indicative of changes in the movement’s goals and purposes.
One year ago today, ‘Hong Kong Add Oil’ was said as a form of encouragement and support. Whilst its reference to ‘Hong Kongers’ can be interpreted as a method of validation of a particular social identity, its supportive message is generalised and aims to reach out to the vast population in Hong Kong; to all who self-identify as a ‘Hong Konger.’ A sense of belonging is evoked as it validates the collective identity regardless of your identification as a peaceful or confrontational protestor. Whilst arguably the case that the phrase communicates exclusively to supporters of the movement, its message of mutual support and encouragement does nothing to invalidate opposing opinions.
One year later today, select protestors on the streets are calling for ‘Hong Kong Independence.’ Whilst indefinitely associated with the recent implementation of the National Security Law and fears for the ‘end’ of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle, the change in slogan perhaps more importantly reflects a strengthened collective identity. However, it's perception as representative of ‘anti-government forces’ and condemnation as acts of ‘rebellion’ has forced its incompatibility in the current climate.
Anderson’s theory of Imagined Communities advocates for ‘nation’ as a ‘socially constructed community’, ‘imagined by the people who see themselves as part of the group’. In its application to Hong Kong, differences in social experiences had characterised the two regions since its divide in 1949. ‘Hong Kong nationalism’ was not initially built upon calls for independence and does not run as a counter-narrative to Chinese nationalism. Whilst culturally it may seem like the case in terms of language and kinship, differences in ‘core values’ arose out of a commonality of experiences; specifically a commonality of long-standing socio-cultural clashes within the society in which its national identification was rekindled in spirit during the anti-extradition demonstrations.
Common experiences of tear gas, rubber bullets, police batons and water trucks helped to redefine Hong Kong’s social and collective identity. The anthem, ‘Glory to Hong Kong,’ came to be recognised as some sort of ‘national anthem’. Reflective of the movement’s leaderless nature, its composition was the product of collective efforts on an online platform. However, it should be noted that its lyrics don’t actually explicitise political rhetorics. Instead, it depicts a commonality of pain and calls on the people to strive for ‘Freedom’ and to seize control over their destiny; its absence being the root cause of the ‘Hong Kong problem.’
Freedom for autonomy has long characterised the ‘Hong Kong problem.’ Ever since the city’s inhabitants were disappointed by the Sino-British Joint Declaration in 1984, clashes within the region have arisen due to repeated surfacings social injustice and actions of deprivation from its people of the promised ‘semi-autonomous rule’ under the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ principle. Desires for ‘autonomy’ is not one dictated solely by rights to self-determination but also freedom of choice in social identification and that of national dignity. However, repeated totalitarian promotions of ‘One China’ have achieved nothing apart from diluting the city’s unique identity. Consequently, the current proliferation of modern ‘localism’ and ‘Hong Kong nationalism’ is concerned exclusively with preserving Hong Kong’s unique identity as determined by its ‘core values’.
Determined to not make the same mistake twice, this renewed focus recognises political change as the necessary means for the achievement of its aims. The rights of the Hong Kong people take precedence above all else and this can only be guaranteed in a democratic regime. Reflecting on the events of last year, a striking commonality exhibited between the anti-extradition demonstrations and those against the National Security Law is that of people’s commitment to struggles for local freedoms, democracy, dignity and welfare. In search of a solution to the ‘Hong Kong problem,’ political rhetorics have become the necessary tool for creating an imagined relation within the Hong Kong collective. However, defamation by the media has equated it with advocacy of independence and promoting separatism from China. It blames the strengthening of collective social identification, ‘Hong Kong nationalism,’ as the instigator of the Hong Kong Independence Movement.
What took place during the summer months of last year and which progressed until the early weeks of 2020 was a series of socio-political struggles. To borrow the government’s rhetorics of condemnation, the anti-extradition demonstrations of last year were characterised by ‘social unrest and political chaos.’ The socio-political struggles of last year were fact, not myth, but when it's perceived that ‘nationalism is a common project for the present and the future, its fulfilment is never finally complete. It must be struggled for in every generation,’ members of the Hong Kong collective identity are struggling for rights to self-determination. Fuelled by a set of ‘core values’ which surfaced from Hong Kong’s long-standing socio-cultural issues, its national identity essentially formed within a political permit to demand self-directing freedoms under broadened national autonomy.
If anything, ‘Hong Kong nationalism’ is of greatest resemblance to civic nationalism. Defined by its set of ‘core values,’ it does not discriminate against ethnicity or race. Instead, for those who believe in Hong Kong’s core values, believe that Hong Kong takes precedence and whose actions benefits local interests, you are likely to be harbouring sentiments of ‘Hong Kong nationalism’; exclusive from secessionist and politically-driven motives, a supporter of features of ‘localism’, and most importantly, part of Hong Kong’s ‘imagined community’.
Note that opinions expressed in the article above do not represent the overall stance of Asiatic Affairs, Students' Union UCL or University College London. If you have read something you would like to respond to, please get in touch with uclasiaticaffairs@gmail.com.
Editors' Note: As a blanket disclaimer for the entire ‘Hong Kong Anti-Extradition Demonstrations: One Year Ago Today’ initiative, we will not be disclosing the identities of any of the contributors to the initiative. We thank everyone who has submitted a piece of their own work and we apologise for not being able to openly accredit you for your contributions.