Contesting Shenzhen’s Modernity: State-legitimisation and public resistance in the People’s Republic of China
Today, Shenzhen is one of the People’s Republic of China’s wealthiest cities, boasting a population of over 17 million people, and attracting millions of younger entrepreneurs that lend the city the nickname “city of young workers” (Kawakami, 2023). While a mere 40 years ago the city had no more than 380,000 inhabitants working primarily in light industry, Shenzhen now boasts the seventh-most Fortune-500 headquarters of any city worldwide, the second largest number of skyscrapers, and ranks as the globe’s eighth largest financial centre (Johnson, 2019). Even the average monthly wage of 127,757 yuan lies significantly above the national average of 29,300 (Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 2020). With this truly astounding growth and accumulation of wealth and power, Shenzhen features as one of the most prominent symbols of China’s rapid economic growth since the reform and opening-up era of the 1980-90’s.
Initially however, this future was more uncertain. As China transitioned away from the Maoist ideology that had defined the early PRC, and towards a more capitalist and trade-orientated economy, the issue of state-legitimisation grew in importance. With the post-reform government no longer legitimised as the product of socialist revolution, what justification did it still possess for single-party authoritarian rule? The government’s need to re-define itself as a guarantor of Chinese strength and prosperity therefore came to the forefront. However to legitimise the state in this way, powerful symbols were needed, and one was found in Shenzhen.
As a totalitarian state, the construction of a new city must be understood as a state-dominated project. In Shenzhen the emphasis of urban construction was on reflecting China as a powerful and prosperous nation. This article will therefore reveal how successful the post-reform state was at co-opting Shenzhen’s image to legitimise itself, and in turn explore post-reform China’s complicated state-society relations.
Building a utopian “world-city” in Shenzhen
To understand this, it is first necessary to evaluate why Shenzhen specifically was chosen to manifest the government’s legitimising vision of a strong and prosperous modern China. One key aspect here is that as Shenzhen was built largely on agricultural land, it possessed no urban history, and therefore lacked the cult of personality around Mao Zedong so prevalent in other Chinese urban centres from the pre-reform era (Cartier, 2002). Without any visual or ideological influences of Maoism, Shenzhen therefore acted as a unique location to create an experimental city defined purely by the post-reform PRC’s values. The desperate political need for legitimisation to counter the institutional instability Deng Xiaoping’s government faced after the Tiananmen massacre of 1989, further spurred development in Shenzhen. Especially after 1992, increasing funds into developing China’s first Special Economic Zone in Shenzhen, allowed the city to swiftly develop tangible visual evidence of economic success and a strong state.
Central to the development of this new city therefore became linking the image of the post-reform state with the financial prosperity symbolised by Shenzhen. The centre of this became the “New City-Centre Project” in Shenzhen’s Futian District. Bundling together the city’s financial, trade, entertainment, and cultural services in a space with futuristic skyscrapers framing a green central axis, known as the Civic Centre, this project would act as a globally recognisable image of modern city-planning. For a Chinese audience too, this shift away from the typical six-storey Socialist housing-blocks associated with Mao’s rule marked a clear departure from pre-reform China. Beyond just visuals however, Futian as a whole was designated for high-technology development, supporting Shenzhen as a new technological and financial centre on par with global competitors like Hong Kong, London, or even New York (Zeng, 2010).
With Municipal Authorities repeatedly emphasising this transformation as creating a “world city”, “international city”, “global city”, or “ecological city”, the ideals of post-reform Chinese urbanity envisioned by the state are clear. To intrinsically link itself to this vision, the government’s spatial positioning within this new urban space was of great importance. Consequently, the new Municipal Government Building is purposefully placed in the middle of the Civic Centre (Cartier, 2002).
However, with Shenzhen’s appearance of modern glass sky-scrapers reflecting a typical American vision of a futuristic city-scape (Futian was even designed by an American architecture firm), if the government sought to co-opt this modernity for legitimation, it had to portray it as distinctly Chinese. This was to be achieved by adapting this western-style commercial space to Chinese cosmological traditions. Shenzhen’s central axis with the new Municipal Government Building at its heart, was therefore constructed along cardinal directions, and on a slight incline from the coast to Lianhua Mountain to its immediate north. Imitating the cosmology of ancient imperial capitals, the Municipal Government building was therefore positioned at the typical site of an imperial palace (Steinhardt, 1990). Furthermore, orientated in the auspicious south-facing direction away from the Mountain, the axis also conforms to Feng Shui ideals that further cosmologically legitimise the government (Cartier, 2002). Finally, the position of a statue of Deng Xiaoping at the peak of Lianhua Mountain overlooking the central axis monumentalises his post-reform government. Shenzhen therefore legitimises the state along clear traditional lines, ultimately linking prosperity and political strength to the government’s rule.
It is therefore clear that the way Shenzhen was developed was no coincidence. Instead, the city is the product of a government-devised plan to concentrate financial growth in a space heavily defined and associated with the post-reform government. With Shenzhen’s rapid economic growth acting as a symbol of post-reform China’s prosperity, intrinsically linking it with the government proved a highly effective tool of legitimisation after a period of political instability.
Shenzhen’s Civic Centre viewed from Lianhua Mountain with the Municipal Government Centre dominating the axis (Yamada, 2019)
Resisting Government oppression in a government-controlled space
Though Shenzhen acts as an irrefutable symbol of government power, its rapid growth over such a short time period also makes it a catalyst for social tensions and, subsequently, public resistance to government authority. While serving to legitimise the post-reform state, the social effects of Futian’s development act as a destabilising force, revealing the complexity of Chinese state-society relations.
It is estimated that around 200 million people, or 15% of China’s population, are “floating migrants” that moved from rural to urban areas in the search of a better life (Du, 2010). In Shenzhen particularly, the city’s population explosion was caused by an influx of such rural migrants. With Shenzhen unable to build as fast as the population swells, the construction of illegal migrant “villages” has become increasingly common (Yang, 2017).
On a visual scale, the presence of haphazardly-constructed shelters and migrant-schools amongst the modern high-rises of Futian undermines the image of a powerful state and prosperous nation and is therefore perceived as a threat to the government’s legitimacy. These structures represent vulnerability and evoke a sense of destitution that ultimately creates an image which juxtaposes and devalues the propagandistic image of Shenzhen.
The initial approach to stop this undermining of Shenzhen’s image was the banning and demolition of illegal structures (Cartier, 2002). However, rather than eliminating the threat increasing urban poverty posed, these measures have had the opposite effect, ultimately stiffening resistance and transforming illegal villages into symbols of public protest.
This is most prominently reflected in Yunong Village to the south of Futian. In what state media dubbed “China’s Number 1 Blast”, 62,000 square-metres of illegally-constructing housing was demolished (Bach, 2010). Despite this brutal reminder of state power over illegal migrants, outside of Yunong Village, the construction of illegal housing actually picked up in the aftermath. With more migrants coming to Shenzhen, the construction of illegal structures grew completely out of control. Even in government-dominated Futian, the demolition of buildings against the wishes of migrants and poor locals proved an intensifying battle. When officials sought to demolish a temple in Futian for example, it was rebuilt, only to be demolished again, and rebuilt again (Cartier, 2002).
It is therefore clear that increasingly violent land expropriations and demolitions of illegal structures had the opposite effect of re-consolidating Shenzhen as a state-controlled space. Rather, as Shenzhen’s modernity became an elite space that visually excluded the urban-poor as they do not fit the government’s image of a prosperous China, increasing public resistance transformed Shenzhen into a space defined by state-society political contestation.
Illegal dwellings in between Shenzhen’s modern high-rises (The Guardian, 2018)
“Civilising Shenzhen” to combat public resistance
As Shenzhen transformed into a contested space, the government’s desire to maintain it as a symbol that legitimised its power became increasingly difficult. Eliminating illegal urban-villages too violently would stiffen resistance, while tolerating their construction would undermine government legitimacy and Shenzhen’s status as a symbol of prosperity and state-power. Consequently, the government shifted tactics. Rather than destroying illegal migrant housing, the state emphasised the need to “civilise” these urban-poor individuals. Shenzhen therefore once again became a central prop in state-legitimisation as the government transformed it into a symbol of its supposed “civilising” and “modernisation” responsibilities towards China’s poorer demographics (Yang, 2017).
At a first glance, this was quickly reflected in the urban landscape through the erection of billboards proclaiming slogans like “Build a civilised citizenry; build a civilised city”, or nominating Shenzhen as one of China’s top ten “civilised cities” (Bach, 2010.; Cartier, 2002). Accordingly, migrants and their illegal housing, regardless of educational, or regional background, were lumped-together as a monolithically “uncivilised” demographic by the state.
This process of “civilising” the urban-poor is also reflected in concrete urban-planning initiatives. In Caiwuwei Village, to the east of Futian, the replacement of informal housing with one of Shenzhen’s high-end malls, the MixC, reflects this particularly clearly. With its Gucci store and ice-rink, the colossal building dominates the small, old neighbouring market town of Dongmen (Bach, 2010). Acting as a clear visual opposite to the high-end and western-style commerciality, Dongmen is emphasised as run-down, poor, and un-modern, consolidating the government’s narrative of the urban-poor being in need of modernisation.
This is further buttressed in a far more obvious way. In 2008, the mall advertised itself with numerous bus station posters depicting a T-shirt, handbag, and porcelain plate framing the English word “civilised”. Below the sign, this time in Chinese, a slogan reads “Civilisation is a taste” (Bach, 2010). Embracing this mixture of English, and a notion of a refined commercial taste as intrinsically linked with “civilisation”, it is clear how the government visually and ideologically links financial prosperity, commerciality, and openness to foreign tastes as cornerstones of a modern individual. Unlike the wealthier elites however, it is impossible for the urban-poor to afford the tastes to make them civilised. The government therefore legitimises itself as a civilised institution that is gradually modernising and civilising the urban-poor.
Ultimately, with the government unable to eliminate the presence of migrants and illegal structures from Shenzhen, it re-established its legitimacy by depicting itself as civilising these demographics. Shenzhen plays a central role in this process: it visually juxtaposes the state to these “unmodern” demographics, and simultaneously acts a propagandistic image of the government spreading civilisation and prosperity in an “uncivilised” area through various redevelopments.
Shenzhen as a symbol of post-reform China?
Despite Shenzhen acting as a key tool of legitimisation for post-reform China, the city also acts as catalyst of public resistance and protest. As the government adjusts its rhetoric of Shenzhen to re-assert its control leveraging its financial prosperity, it is clear that Shenzhen reflects both the government’s ideological focuses and reveals much about state-society relations. By grouping together all urban-poor as a supposedly monolithic “uncivilised” demographic, it is clear that this relationship is anything but stable . As China continues to grow and transform, looking to Shenzhen can reveal much about the power of the state and its ideology.
Bibliography
Bach, Jonathan. ‘”They come in peasants and leave citizens”: Urban Villages and the Making of Shenzhen, China’, in Cultural Anthropology, 25:3 (August 2010), 421-458.
Building Engines for Growth and Competitiveness in China: Experience with Special Economic Zones and Industrial Clusters, Douglas Zeng, (ed.), (Washington D.C., 2010).
Cartier, Carolyn. ‘Transnational Urbanism in the Reform-era Chinese City: Landscapes from Shenzhen’, in Urban Studies, 39:9 (August 2002), 1513-1532.
Du, Juan. ‘Shenzhen: Urban Myth of a New Chinese City’, in Journal of Architectural Education, 63:2 (March 2010), 65-66.
Kawakami, Takashi. ‘Shenzhen, China’s ‘city of young migrants,’ at point of inflection’, Nikkei Asia (9 July 2023), at: https://asia.nikkei.com/Economy/Shenzhen-China-s-city-of-young-migrants-at-point-of-inflection, accessed 22 Nov. 2023.
Shenzhen Statistics Bureau, 深圳统计年鉴 2020 (Shenzhen Statistical Yearbook 2020), (Shenzhen, 2020), at: https://web.archive.org/web/20210727043152/http://tjj.sz.gov.cn/attachment/0/736/736628/8386382.pdf, accessed 22 Nov. 2023.
Steinhardt, Nancy. Imperial City Planning, (Honolulu, 1990).
The Story of Shenzhen: Its Economic, Social and Environmental Transformation, Cathryn Johnson and Lawrence Scott Davis, (eds.), (Nairobi, 2019), at: https://www.metropolis.org/sites/default/files/resources/the_story_of_shenzhen_2nd_edition_sep_2019_0.pdf, accessed 22 Nov. 2023.
‘Urban Mountains: Shenzhen’s green rooftop project – in pictures’, The Guardian (7 November 2018), at: https://www.theguardian.com/cities/gallery/2018/nov/07/urban-mountains-shenzhens-green-rooftop-project-in-pictures, accessed 22 Nov. 2023.
Yamada, Shuhei. ‘Shenzhen in pictures: a former fishing village is transformed’, Nikkei Asia (4 August 2019), at: https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/China-tech/Shenzhen-in-pictures-a-former-fishing-village-is-transformed, accessed 22 Nov. 2023.
Yang, Fan. ‘Temporality and Shenzhen Urbanism in the Era of “Chinese Dreams”’, in Verge: Studies in Global Asias, 3:1 (Spring 2017), 189-212.
Note that opinions expressed in the article above do not necessarily represent the overall stance of Asiatic Affairs, Students' Union UCL or University College London. If you have read something you would like to respond to, please get in touch with uclasiaticaffairs@gmail.com.
Want to write for us? Don’t worry about experience - we are always looking for writers interested in Asiatic affairs. Submit your ideas at https://forms.gle/koQbsExb6XsAy1Tk6 and we’ll get in touch.