The Belt and Road Initiative: A Pursuit of Hegemony
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), previously referred to as the ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative, represents a critical foreign policy strategy adopted by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in connecting Asia to Europe and Africa through land and maritime routes. One of the signature foreign policy schemes set into motion under the leadership of Xi Jinping, the initiative seeks to foster economic cooperation and expand trade.
Introduced in 2013, the BRI’s underlying purpose has been widely contested. While certain political analysts view it purely as an expansion of China’s power and its growth towards regional hegemony in Asia, others see it as a response to the United States’ (US) interests in the region through economic motivations. Ultimately, unravelling the geopolitical and economic strategy underpinning the PRC’s trillion-dollar infrastructure project is imperative to gain insight into the future of Asian geopolitics.
Upon its introduction, the BRI initiative constituted two key components: the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Maritime Silk Road (Chatzky, 2023). In the past decade, nearly 147 countries have joined or shown an interest in joining the initiative. One of the flagship projects of China’s BRI project has been the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), in which it has invested nearly $62 billion over 15 years (Chatzky, 2023).
The PRC’s broader motivations for the project can also be seen as an innate desire to increase regional and global dominance, particularly to counter US interests and influence in Asia. This assertive foreign policy strategy is not only seen through the BRI but also through the ‘Made in China 2025’ initiative, which seeks to enable China to supersede the West in technology manufacturing through the rapid development of high-tech industries such as artificial intelligence (AI), electric vehicles, and telecommunication services.
The BRI has benefited Asia in many ways, offering a glimpse of the future implications of the project on the continent. Specifically, Southeast Asia has benefited enormously from the BRI through its improvement of interregional connectivity. The likes of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines have received the project favourably as it has expedited infrastructure development through “railways, highways, sea ports, power plants, and digital communication network facilities,” which has been a dire need in the region due to “inadequate port capacity and roads'' that has constrained “the expansion of intraregional and interregional trade” (Yu, 2017, p. 120).
However, the BRI initiative is vital to Chinese interests in boosting economic growth. The PRC has gained leverage over countries participating in the BRI by establishing trade links with Western regions and trade with Central Asia and the Middle East over energy resources (Chatzky, 2023). This leverage gives the PRC powers to demand the repayment of loans from BRI countries and compels them to support its actions. For example, Nicaragua joined the BRI in January 2022 after severing its ties with Taiwan, which has been at a crossroads with China over its national sovereignty (Davidson & Zhu, 2021). This manipulative leverage has seen China accused of ‘debt trap diplomacy’ (Wong, 2023), which refers to its intentional funding of infrastructure development to underdeveloped countries, such as Nicaragua, that do not have the wherewithal to pay off its loans. As a result, the recipients of Chinese funding are financially indebted to the PRC, enabling it to extract political concessions from them. Ultimately, China’s leverage indicates its desire to strengthen its global hegemony and status as the dominant power in Asia.
Furthermore, national security concerns and the desire to maintain the balance of power have raised suspicion of the BRI among Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines despite its obvious economic advantages. Fears of economic dependence on China remain prevalent, mainly due to mistrust towards the PRC’s true intentions of expanding its military and naval prowess, which may lead to the eventual creation of a “Sinocentric geopolitical order in Asia” (Yu, 2017, p. 122). These fears, not only by Southeast Asian countries but also by the US, have been manifested through an increase in US military presence in countries such as the Philippines and Vietnam.
It is also important to note the US’s efforts in augmenting security dialogue with a multitude of Asian countries through the establishment of partnerships such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), the AUKUS project, and the US-Japan-South Korea trilateral partnership (Rasheed, 2023). Overall, these efforts depict the tensions prevalent in Asia from endogenous actors, such as Asian states, and exogenous actors, like the US, in attempts to undercut China’s growing regional and global dominance.
Notwithstanding widespread scepticism and the decline in Chinese involvement in BRI countries by nearly 40% since its peak in 2018 (Bloomberg News, 2023), the initiative not only remains an ever-present threat to the US but, more importantly, a key determinant of Asian geopolitics in the time to come. Certain ASEAN states have openly countered Chinese maritime influence and activity in the South China Sea by allying with the US and rejecting China’s ‘nine-dash’ line, which it claims establishes its sovereignty over the sea. Even so, the BRI has lured ASEAN states into the Chinese sphere of influence (Murphy, 2023). This appeal is evident through the cases of many Southeast Asian states that have accepted short-term Chinese investment through the BRI despite the inherent risks associated with increased economic interdependency and possible exploitation in the long term. For example, despite being a part of the ASEAN network, Indonesia has seen China become its largest trading partner, as observed through the rapid progress in constructing the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Railway (Murphy, 2023).
Conclusively, the recent downturn in BRI involvement from its peak a few years ago, coupled with the US’s persistent efforts to prevent Chinese regional dominance, has not entirely diminished the BRI’s appeal. Despite its shortcomings and suspicions, the BRI continues to economically incentivise Asian states, tying them to long-term financial commitments and propelling them into China’s realm of influence. In essence, the tide seems to firmly favour Chinese hegemony in Asia.
Bibliography
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Image Source: Xu Qin/Xinhua/Getty Images
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