Selective political memories and the justification of South Korean government

South Korea was built on anti-Japanese and anti-communist ideologies. The constitution of Korea clearly states that it ‘upholds the cause of the Provisional Republic of Korea Government born of the March First Independence Movement of 1919’, which was a national movement that resisted the Japanese empire in peaceful means after ten years of the Japanese occupation of Korea (Korean Law Research Institute, 1987). Also, South Korea was a barrier for the United States to contain the spread of communism from the North during the Cold War. The United States occupied Korea after its independence for a few years (and American troops remain in South Korea till these days), leaving Syngman Rhee as the successor of American ideological purpose in the peninsula upon its retreat. 

The very existence of the South Korean government comes from anti-Japanese movements and the American legacy of anti-communist ideology. However, depending on regime changes, the South Korean government chooses to neglect or uplift certain anti-Japanese or communist narratives according to their political interests. Such political phenomenon demonstrates that power-making in South Korea and regime justification depends on the selective processes of history and memory-making. 

South Korea and its Narrative of Japan

          In 2019, South Korea enforced a nationwide boycott movement against Japanese products, which lasted for nearly a year (Soheili, 2019). It was caused by the Korean Supreme Court ruling that Japanese wartime corporations were to compensate the ‘comfort women’, who are the victims of Japanese imperial army-led sex slavery during WWII, consisting largely of Korean girls aged 14-18. The Japanese government responded by employing economic sanctions on South Korea, and the South Korean public embarked on a boycott to counter that decision. In 2019, the South Korean government unconditionally supported the national movement.

           The boycott movement is historically and nationally significant to South Koreans. They boycotted major Japanese companies like Uniqlo, Daiso and even Korean-owned Japanese restaurants. However, Tae-Jung Kang in The Diplomat argued that the ‘standoff with Japan [was] good for the [ruling] party’s chances in the upcoming election’ (Kang, 2019). The anti-Japan sentiment was a tool of the then-South-Korean government to consolidate and retain its power, and the incident in 2019 was not the first time that the Korean government used the ideology to retain its power.

          According to a survey done by Japan Times, only 17% of South Koreans showed satisfaction with Japan in 2019 (The Japan Times, 2021). This  goes back to the Japanese colonisation of Korea for forty years until it lost WWII in 1945. The Japanese Empire committed crimes against Korea, including sex slavery, forced labour, genocide, and cultural and religious oppression. Today, Koreans believe that Japan is falsely claiming ‘Dokdo’ island as Japanese territory (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Republic of Korea, 2013). They show strong disapproval towards the past actions of the Japanese Empire and the current foreign policies of the Japanese government. However, according to historian Alexis Dudden, it was not until the first president Syngman Rhee brought the issues up about Japan that such sentiment in South Korea grew (Dudden, 2008). Rhee triggered news media like Chosun-Ilbo and Donga-Ilbo to publish fierce articles on the ‘illegal’ and ‘secretive’ actions of the Japanese government in stealing the island from South Korea (Dudden, 2008). President Rhee made his own ‘Syngman Rhee Line’ to reinforce his position in this movement, including the island within the Korean border. 

           President Rhee’s actions were selective and strategic as he initially used the advantage of colonial officials to gain power after the independence by reviving the old colonial system of governing and re-employing former colonial officers. He even eliminated the South Korean Truth Commission – an organisation formed to investigate anti-Korean acts of colonial officers and punish them – to keep the officers in place. The colonial officials took this as an opportunity to retain their power, and their network and wealth assisted Rhee in securing his political power in South Korea. Rhee’s action was directly contrary to that of Kim Il-sung, the first ruler of North Korea. Kim eliminated every trace of colonial officials once he gained power while Rhee strategically used pro- and anti-Japanese narratives to secure his regime. 

           In 1963, President Park Chung-hee came into power using a military coup. He gained criticism in 1965 when he formed a diplomatic relationship with Japan. In the process, he concluded the reparation problem regarding the ‘comfort women’, leaving the issue not clearly resolved and the victims not fully and properly compensated (Do, 2015). He aimed to receive money from Japan to develop the Korean economy. His actions back then caused a huge uproar, and many Koreans today also disapprove of his actions. Later, in the democratic movement in 1989 and onwards, the legacies of dictatorial rule were investigated and condemned, including that of President Park. With the testimony of former ‘comfort woman’ Kim Hak-soon in August 1991, more victims were inspired to speak to the public (Ryu, 2023). Since then, Korean presidents – who are now democratically elected – have expressed strong regrets over Japan’s denial and failure to compensate past victims. As the South Korean government utilised popular anti-Japan actions to retain its legitimacy, Korea and Japan have been uncomfortable allies since then. 

           Weirdly enough, the South Korean government out-ruled its decision to require Japanese companies to compensate the victims in 2021, saying ‘the 1965 pact covered victims' right to damages and South Korea was bound by it’ (Shin, 2021). Furthermore, the new regime in 2022 actively sought Japanese cooperation and alliance to strengthen the South Korea-America-Japan alliance. The new president, Yoon Seok-Yeol, approved Japanese release of nuclear water into the Pacific Ocean in August 2023, arousing another wave of public anger in South Korea (Reuters, 2023). The South Korean government, regardless of who rules it, strategically uses anti- or pro-Japanese narratives for  its political interest. 

South Korea and its Narrative of Communism

        South Korea began as a self-proclaimed anti-communist and ‘liberal’ country with the help of the United States. For South Koreans, the Korean War (1950-53) was a struggle against communism. Since then, South Koreans have shown disapproval of the existence of communism, disregarding and even neglecting its ideological meanings. The South Korean government in early years reinforced this idea and acted as the ‘protector’ of South Koreans against communism.

        Anti-communist sentiment became even stronger under the dictatorial rule of President Park. The ‘anti-communist law’ was reinforced, and the efforts to eliminate spies intensified. In 1968, the story of Lee Seung-bok spread rapidly across the nation when Lee and his family were killed brutally by North Korean soldiers when the boy said: ‘I do not like the communist party’ (Lee, 2004). His ‘heroic’ act spread amongst Koreans and was included in the South Korean curriculum in the 20th century. The government at that time externally supported ‘unification’, but it actively ignited and supported the anti-communist behaviour of its people.

        Anti-communist sentiment has decreased while dependence on Chinese goods has grown. After the end of the Cold War, South Korea finally formed diplomatic relations with China in 1992. Recently in 2018, South Korean President Moon Jae-in held a summit with Kim Jong-Un to work toward the end of the Korean War (Koreas are still in armistice) (The AP, 2021). However, Koreans are outraged by Chinese unreasonably claiming Korean Hanbok, Kimchi, and its history originating from China (McCurry, 2020). Despite huge anti-communist uproar in the South Korean public, anti-communist actions of the government diminished, and the government in 2019 was working to cooperate with China and North Korea.

        However, the new government that came into power in 2022 drastically changed its strategies against China and North Korea by re-strengthening its ties with Japan and the United States. It even held a huge-scale military parade in September 2023, which was held for the first time in a decade (Yeung and Bae, 2023). The parade was symbolic, as it was also the first time the American soldiers stationed in Korea marched along with the South Korean army. This current government is now strategically re-enforcing anti-communist and liberal ideologies to justify its rule. 

Cultural Integration?

           Despite these political tensions and strategies, South Korean people show interest and enthusiasm towards Japanese and Chinese culture. In 2022-23, a trip to Japan was a huge cultural trend in South Korea. There are new Japanese restaurants and shops in many places around Seoul. Furthermore, South Koreans love Chinese food such as malatang and tanghulu, even making their own variations of these foods. The South Korean sentiments of Japan and China are complicated matters. The public loves the cultural factor of each culture, but the South Korean government strategically employs different narratives on the two countries to justify its power. Therefore, the relationship between Japan, South Korea, and China is multifaceted and complicated.

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